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Column
Putting the Science in Digital Forensics1
By Fred Cohen
In a recent study,2 digital forensics was found to lack a consensus around even
the most basis notions and terminology of the field. To quote: “These two
preliminary studies individually suggest that (1) scientific consensus in the area
of digital forensic evidence examination is lacking in the broad sense, but that
different groups within that overall community may have limited consensus
around areas in which they have special expertise, and (2) that the current peerreviewed publication process is not acting to bring about the sorts of elements
typically found in the advancement of a science toward such a consensus. ...
perhaps the most significant challenge may be in the development of a
common language to describe the field...”
If we are to progress as a scientific discipline applicable to legal proceedings,
digital forensics has to recognize and reasonably apply history and precedent,
use common language for effective communication, and limit our findings to
what the scientific understanding of the day justifies. As a starting point, a
short history of diplomatics and archival science may be helpful, and is
provided here. Following that, a set of usages and definitions of terms is
proposed for JDFSL and the broader digital forensics community.
Some history
Legal systems over several millennia have had to deal with issues related to the
admission and use of informational evidence in legal matters. This ranges from
documents associating ownership of property through the emergence of
fingerprints as evidence and their near demise. As an overarching science, the
areas of archival science and diplomatics are among the oldest and most deeply
embedded in the legal systems of the World, and are thus a good starting point.
Archival science started as a scientific body of knowledge at least in ancient
Rome, were the records of government were written on wax tablets and
transported through underground passageways to the central archives for
permanent archival preservation. Such records were tracked and made
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available to the public only in certified copies produced by the archivists who
were government employees trusted to diligently perform their duties
(quaestores).3
The Justinian code codified the definition of archives as “the place where
public records are deposited” … so that “they remain uncorrupted and might be
found rapidly by those who request them”, and so they “preserve perpetual
memory [of] the acts [to which they relate]”. These principles and approaches
have been taught since 1158 in all of the legal educational systems associated
with “common law” and formed the foundation for admissibility of records and
reliance upon them. By the 1500s these ideas became a far more widespread
subject of research and implementation, and various facets of understanding
relating to the trustworthiness of records were studied and put in to practice
over the centuries.
In 1681, the archival science was codified into a legal framework4 which
focused on individual documents, their characteristics, genesis, and treatment.5
Archival science and diplomatics were developed together, and in the 1800s
laws were increasingly being formulated taking into account their concepts and
methodologies. By the late 1800s, rules of evidence and their foundation were
explained in detail and by the early 1900s, they were clearly codified into laws
globally. Today, diplomatics is being updated and applied to information age
records around the World for public and private archival organizations. It
remains the basis for much of the legal system, and as such, forms a scientific
basis for understanding digital evidence.6
“According to modern diplomatics, a record is a document created (i.e., made
or received and set aside for action or reference) in the course of activity as an
instrument and by-product of it.”7 The field of diplomatics focuses on the
assessment of the trustworthiness of records, which is done retrospectively
for existing records (and in digital forensics), and prospectively for designing
record systems and types. Classic diplomatics associates trustworthiness with
authenticity of the records (they were written at the time claimed and signed
by a person competent to produce them). Modern diplomatics defines and
assesses “trustworthiness” in terms of reliability, authenticity, accuracy, as
a basis to authenticate a record.
There is a great deal more to know about these issues, and the reader is
encouraged to read the references.
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Careful use of defined terms
No matter how many tests are performed, except for special cases, DFE results
cannot prove a broad claim true.8 The best that can be done is to show that tests
failed to refute hypotheses and to show the extent to which tests were thorough.
Reasonably, the most authoritative claim in [opposition] support of a
hypothesis regarding DFE is therefore something like:
"The results of [the tests I did] were [in]consistent with [the hypotheses]."
To the extent that some set of these statements then combine together with
logical reasoning, an overarching statement may be made with regard to the
claims, perhaps of the form:
Based on [the basis], I found [traces and events] to be [in]consistent with
[claim(s)].
Or in some cases, when this is true:
In my examinations of [traces and events], everything I found was
consistent with [claims] and nothing I found was inconsistent with
[claims].
On the other hand, a single refutation disproves a hypothesis, and the least that
can be reasonably said if such a refutation is identified is something like:
"The [procedures I performed] demonstrate that [traces and events] are
[inconsistent with / refute] [the hypothesis]."
Thus the methodology of the science of DFE when working on ay particular
matter consists of:





Devising testable hypotheses (hאE)
Testing those hypotheses against the evidence (T and E) using
forensic procedures (P) and logic to determine type C and D
consistency by attempting to refute the hypotheses.
Making properly limited statements about the results of those
tests, typically using wording such as that identified above.

There are some other wordings that may apply in other circumstances, and
some of the more commonly misused ones are identified below, along with
definitions suited to use by the DFE examiner.
By the careful use of these terms and their consistent application, the field of
DFE examination may move forward more quickly, and peer reviews
undertaken in the field may be able to create a body of work that is meaningful
across time and endeavors. But if, as a field, DFE examination is inconsistent,
8

K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Hutchins and Company, London.
ISBN10: 0415278449.

9

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(1)
or if the peer review process fails to force compliance with such terminology,
then the science is unlikely to proceed as a normal science or at a rapid pace.
Proposed usage
I propose that the following usages be required for all future JDFSL
submissions, to be augmented over time only as justified by a demonstrated
community consensus. These terms are intended to be mandatory for
submissions, enforced in refereeing and editorial processes, and applied
uniformly to all who seek to publish in JDFSL.
Traces, events, and records
Trace := (digital forensics) A set of bit sequences produced from the execution of a finite
state machine.(FSM)
Structured trace := A trace that follows a particular defined pattern.
Unstructured trace := A trace that is not structured. [Typically image data such
as from sound, vision, or other external sensors.]
Derived trace := A trace generated by the examiner from another trace.
Constructed trace := A trace constructed from a reconstruction process.
C-trace := Constructed trace.
Original trace := A trace produced from evidence in the matter.
O-trace := Original trace.
Complete trace := A trace containing all inputs, states, and outputs of a finite
state machine (FSM).
Partial trace := A trace that is not a complete trace.
Incomplete trace := A partial trace from which a complete trace cannot be
uniquely reconstructed.
Event := (forensics) A claimed, asserted, or stipulated state of affairs or act.
Anchor event := An event asserted by the examiner based on personal
experience or other authority and that can be linked to the issues in the case.
[e.g., A time stamp from an external mechanism that the examiner has
personal knowledge of.]
Record := A document created (i.e., made or received and set aside for action or
reference) in the course of activity as an instrument and by-product of it. [All digital
records are traces, but not all traces are records]
Internal record := A record meant for transmission over time.
External record := A record record meant for transmission across space.
Legal record := A record whose existence in writing is required by the juridical
and/or administrative system within which it is created.
Public record := A record issued by a public person. [see below]
Nonlegal record := A record whose written form is discretionary.

10

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(1)
Supporting record := A record that helps to carry out activities in
which it participates (e.g., a map, note, plan, presentation, etc.) [Does
not provide evidence that any such act was actually carried out]
Narrative record := Free-form communications of information (e.g.,
memos, messages, etc.) [Is not adequate to show that any such act
was actually carried out.]
Instructive record := A record that indicates the form in which
something is to be presented or done (e.g., manuals, regulations,
instructions for filling out forms, etc.)
Enabling record := Records that either (1) enable performance of a
mechanism (e.g., firmware or an operating system), (2) execute
business instructions (e.g., a workflow application), (3) conduct
experiments (e.g., a control program for a robotic mechanism), or (4)
data used in or produced by analysis or observation.
Original record := The first manifestation of a complete and effective record,
either received or stored, depending on whether the record is external or
internal. [This is essentially never available for DFE examination because of it's
physical nature.]
Draft := A document prepared for the purpose of correction, and meant to be
provisional and temporary.
Copy := A reproduction of another document. [The other document could be an
“original”, “draft”, or another “copy”]
Copy in the form of original := A copy that is identical to the original
in all respects, but produced at a later time. [This is a physical copy of
the media, which is outside of the realm of digital forensics.]
Imitative copy := A reproduction of both the form and content of a
record. [This is what is typically available and called an “exact”, “bit
image”, or “forensically sound”, copy in digital forensics.]
Exact copy := (forensics) imitative copy.
Bit image copy := (forensics) imitative copy.
Forensically sound copy := (forensics) imitative copy.
Simple copy := A transcription of the record content. [The text]
Inserts := A copy of a record or part of it contained within another
original record.
Medium := (diplomatics) The physical carrier of a record.
Form := (diplomatics) The rules governing the representation of an act in writing.
Archive := (diplomatics) Sedimentations of the natural documentary residue of
activities.
Archives := The whole of the documents made or received in the course of activity and
kept for action or reference. [In archives, there is one archive for each physical or
juridical person, or creator. Therefore, each archives (or archival fonds, the terms being
synonyms) is a whole of the records made by one creator and their interrelationships.]
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Archival bond := (diplomatics) The relationship of a record to the other records within
the archives in which it exists.
Provenance := from the Latin "prōvenīre", which means "to come forth", (pro-, convene,
-ant). Identification of the origins and path by which something came to be.

Procedures and processes
Procedure := (diplomatics)
carried out.

A formal sequence of steps by which a transaction is

Procedure := (forensics) A formal sequence of steps by which an examiner examines
traces.
Transaction := an act aimed to create, modify, maintain, or extinguish relationships
between two or more physical or corporate persons. [Some acts, especially
transactions, occur in writing or other documentary forms, thereby resulting in records.]
Process := (diplomatics) is a series of motions by which a person carries out acts,
including those acts involved in a procedure. [These are the physical acts undertaken]
Process := (computers) a sequence of programmed instructions and related data
executing within an operating environment. [There is typically a process identification
number within the operating system structures, and there may be “threads” of execution
by which multiple execution streams are simultaneously available to execute]

Persons
Person := The subject of a right or duty. [They are recognized by the legal system as
capable of acts.]
Physical person := A human being.
Juridical person := A corporation or similar legal entity.
Succession := A position or title. [e.g., The President]
Public person := A person with responsibility for the administration of matters
regarding the people as a whole [i.e., A person authorized to issue a public
record.]
Private person := Any person not a public person.
Author := The person with the competence (i.e., authority and capacity) to
issue the record.
Writer := The person competent for the articulation and disclosure of the
record.
Addressee := The person for whom the record is intended.
Creator := The person in whose archives a record exists.
Originator := The person responsible for the electronic account or space in
which the record was generated or from which it is sent.
Mens rae := A guilty state of mind.
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Examination and computers
Analysis := Methods used to determine consistency or inconsistency of traces and
events. [Typically, trace typing, generating derived traces, making various comparisons,
and other similar processes.]
Interpretation := A cognitive process used by the examiner to understand the nature of
traces and events in context and associate them with issues at hand. [It may be thought
of as associating meaning with traces and events.]
Attribution := An interpretation of causality. [Typically identifying plausible (cause effect)
sequences consistent with available traces and events. Particularizing or individualizing
traces to candidate causes.]
Reconstruction := An experiment testing hypothesized causal chains. [Used to
demonstrate consistency or inconsistency with hypothesized sequences.]
Presentation := A method by which traces (i.e., latent evidence) are make into
something that can be sensed and observed by humans.
Characteristic := Trace type, syntax, and structure.
Feature := Trace content [e.g., Sequences of words, types of spelling errors, etc.]
Symbol set := A mapping between bit sequences and symbols they represent in an
alphabet.
Octet := An 8-bit sequence.
Byte := An 8-bit sequence at a defined boundary.
Trace type := The thing that a trace is intended to represent when generated.
Typing := (forensics) A process by which the type of a trace is hypothesized for
examination. [Traces may be retyped after further examination based on consistency
analysis.]
Particularization := A process by which a typed trace is associated with a specific use
or source.
Individualization := A process by which a trace is associated with an single specific
person, process, or mechanism.
Identifier := A trace placed in records intended to associate the trace with a particular
person, process, or other thing.
Indicator := Traces and/or events often associated with or produced by other known
traces, events, or mechanisms.
Equivalent content := (inexact matches) The same content in different format.
Normalization := Conversion into a common commensurable format.
Nominal metrics := Lists of things with no basis for formal comparison.
Ordinal metrics := Implies a partial ordering.
Interval metrics := Implies the ability to count things not against any standard.
Ratio metrics := Additive, comparable, and normalized to a common zero value.
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Wording in reports
Suggests := imply as a possibility ("The [traces / events] suggests ...") - calls to mind propose a hypothesis or possible explanation.
Indicates := a summary of a statement or statements or other content codified ("His
statement indicates that ...") OR a defined set of "indicators" are present and have,
through some predefined methodology been identified as such ("The presence of [...]
(smoke) indicates [...] (fire)")
Demonstrate := exemplify - show - establish the validity of - provide evidence for ("The
reconstruction demonstrates that ...")
Correlates := a statistical relation between two or more variables such that systematic
changes in the value of one variable are accompanied by systematic changes in the
other as shown by statistical studies ("Based on [statistical analysis method(s)], the use
of the "KKJ" account is correlated (p=95%) with ...")
Match := an exact duplicate ("These two documents have matching publication dates,
page counts, ...")
Similar := A correspondence or resemblance as defined by specified and measured
quantities or qualities ("The 18 files were similar in that they all had syntax consistent
with HTML, sizes under 1000 bytes, ...")
Relate := A defined and specified link ("The file system is related to FAT32 in that FAT32
was derived from ...")
Associate := Make a logical or causal connection with basis provided. ("I associate
these bit sequences with program crashes because …")

A final comment
I can propose, but I cannot dictate. At the end of the day, the enforcement of
this or any approach to using defined terms carefully and consistently can only
be carried out by the authors and editors of the journal and across the field. The
editorial board of JDFSL has the final say, and I encourage all who participate
in the field and in this journal to enter the debate and let your voices be heard.
This is the only way we will achieve the consensus needed to move forward. At
least that's how I see it.
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